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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. stood alone in its anti-bribery legislation from 1977, when
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA")1 was initially passed, until the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (the "OECD")
adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions ("OECD Convention") in 1997,
resulting in OECD signatory nations adopting implementing legislation.2
France's adoption of implementing legislation in 2002 provided the basis
for the investigation by one of its magistrates into the allegations that a
. Professor, College of Business Administration, California State University, Long
Beach. 1999 University Outstanding Professor and 2001 University Academic Leadership
Award. J.D., University of Iowa.
** Professor and Associate Director of the Ukleja Center for Ethical Leadership, College
of Business Administration, California State University, Long Beach. J.D., M.B.A.,
University of Southern California.
1 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. Law No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified
as amended in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78 dd-
2, 78ff (2000)); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
102 Stat. 1415 (enacted as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-418, §§ 1001-10013, 102 Stat. 1107); International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 [hereinafter FCPA].
2 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, 37
I.L.M 1, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/21/
0,2340,en 2649_201185_2017813_1 1 1_1,00.html [hereinafter OECD Convention].
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Halliburton subsidiary, TSKJ,3 had engaged in bribery activities in Nigeria.4
What began as a French investigation 5 into allegations of improper
payments by a TSKJ agent to Nigerian government officials in exchange for
favorable treatment in contracts connected with the construction of a
multibillion dollar natural gas liquefaction complex at Bonny Island,
Nigeria has widened into an investigation by the Nigerian government 6 and
FCPA investigations by the U.S. Department of Justice7 and Securities and
Exchange Commission.8
The issues raised by the French inquiry into HalliburtonITSKJ's
alleged payments to Nigerian government officials of about $180 million in
exchange for securing contractual advantages provide an excellent model
3 TSKJ won contracts from the Nigerian government to build and expand the liquefied
natural gas project at Bonny Island in Rivers State, Nigeria. TSKJ is a private limited
liability company registered in Madeira, Portugal whose members are Technip SA of France,
Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V., an affiliate of ENI SpA of Italy, M. W. Kellogg (which
became Kellogg, Brown & Root or KBR after the 1998 Halliburton acquisition of M.
Kellogg) of the U.S., and JGC Corporation of Japan, each of which owns 25% of the
venture. Hatliburton Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 22 (Mar. 1, 2005), available at
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/45012/000004501205000055/0000045012-05-000055-
index.htm [hereinafter Halliburton Co., Annual Report].
The connection to Halliburton Co. is through the "K" for "Kellogg" in the letters that
make up the name of the TSKJ Consortium. M. W. Kellogg Ltd. was the original member of
TSKJ before it became a subsidiary of Halliburton Company in 1998 when Halliburton
acquired its parent corporation, Dresser Co. After Halliburton's acquisition of Dresser, M.
W. Kellogg's business was joined with an earlier Halliburton acquisition, Brown & Root, to
become KBR, the engineering and construction group within Halliburton. See
Halliburton.com, History of Halliburton, http://www.halliburton.com/about/history.jsp (last
visited Mar. 2, 2006); see Jim Landers & Richard Whittle, Bribery Case Findings Detailed
Halliburton Says Incidents Predate Ownership of Firm, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 3,
2004, at 2D.
4 C. Pn. Art. 435, translated at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes-traduits/
codepenal textan.htm; see also Law No. 2000-595 of June 30, 2000, Journal Officiel de la
R~publique Franqaise [J.0.] [Official Gazette of France] 9944 (2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2376874.pdf (modifying the Penal Code).
5 See Bruce Zagaris, French Investigate Halliburton & Technip's Energy Payments in
Nigeria, 20 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 4 (2004).
6 NIG. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PETITION COMM., INTERIM REPORT: THE
HALLIBURTON/TSKJ/LNG INVESTIGATION (2004), available at http://halliburtonwatch.org/
news/nigeriaparliamentreport.pdf; see Ahamefula Ogbu, House Probes Halliburton
Bribery Scandal, THIS DAY (NIG.), Feb. 16, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 7020299.
7 See Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, Terror Watch. Another Halliburton Probe,
NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVES, Feb. 4, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 3639294.
8 Press Release, Halliburton Co., Halliburton Announces SEC Investigation Regarding
Nigerian Joint Venture (June 11, 2004), available at http://www.halliburton.com/news/
archive/2004/corpnws 061104.jsp [hereinafter Press Release, Halliburton Announces SEC
Investigation]; see Russell Gold, Halliburton Says SEC Opened Probe into Payments, WALL
ST. J., June 14, 2004, at A3.
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for examining the influence of the current anti-corruption environment on
FCPA enforcement. 9 The French are examining allegations of illicit
payments to Nigerian government officials by the TSKJ joint venture in
which Halliburton Company's subsidiary, Kellogg Brown & Root
("KBR"), 10 is a partner. 1  With an American corporation involved, 12 the
French regulators related the information they had obtained to their U.S.
compliance counterparts. 13
This Paper will: 1) discuss the factual background of the alleged
Halliburton/TSKJ misconduct and the pending investigations by various
government agencies in several countries; 2) identify the relevant FCPA
provisions, case law and policy; and 3) examine the anti-corruption
environment which has influenced increased enforcement of the FCPA and
its potential implications for the pending Halliburton/TSKJ investigation.
II. CURRENT FRENCH, DOJ, SEC, AND NIGERIAN INVESTIGATIONS OF
HALLIBURTON/TSKJ FOR POTENTIAL FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
VIOLATIONS
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF ALLEGED HALLIBURTON/TSKJ
BRIBERY MISCONDUCT
TSKJ, through its agent, Tri Star, is alleged to have made payments to
Nigerian government officials of up to $180 million in exchange for
lucrative contracts. 14 Starting in 1994, the joint venture, TSKJ, 15 entered
into a series of contracts to build and expand the liquefied natural gas
project for Nigeria LNG Limited 16 at Bonny Island in Rivers State. M.W.
9 Gold, supra note 8.
10 M.W. Kellogg became a subsidiary of Halliburton when its parent, Dresser Industries
was acquired by Halliburton in 1998. Landers & Whittle, supra note 3. M. W. Kellogg Ltd.
had been a member of the TSKJ joint venture from 1994. Id. After the merger of Dresser
and Halliburton, M. W. Kellogg Ltd. was joined with the Brown and Root operations to
become Kellogg, Brown and Root or KBR.
1 See Zagaris, supra note 5, at 4.
12 Halliburton is incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware. Halliburton Co.,
Annual Report, supra note 3, at 4.
13 Michael D. Goldhaber, A Level Playing Field-World Joins U.S. in Cracking Down
on Businesses Offering Bribes Overseas, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., Jan. 6, 2005, at A1O.
14 Gold, supra note 8.
15 Id.
16 Nigeria LNG Limited is owned by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Shell
Gas B.V., Cleag Limited (an affiliate of Total which was formerly Elf Aquitaine), and Agip
International B.V., which is an affiliate of ENI SpA of Italy. Halliburton Co., Annual Report
supra note 3, at 22; see also Total, Total, a Multicultural, Richly Diverse Group,
www.total.com/en/group/presentation/history (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).
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Kellogg-a twenty-five percent partner in TSKJ-was allegedly its lead
company. 17  M.W. Kellogg became part of Halliburton in 1998, when
Halliburton acquired its parent company, Dresser Industries.' 8 After the
acquisition, M. W. Kellogg's business was merged with an earlier
Halliburton acquisition, Brown & Root, to become KBR, the engineering
and construction unit within Halliburton. 19 Some of the M.W. Kellogg
executives, who later worked for KBR, have been targeted for alleged
misdeeds in the government investigations of bribery.2°
Commencing in 1995, TSKJ entered into an agency agreement with
Tri Star Investments, a firm headed by a British lawyer, Jeffrey Tesler.
21
The TSKJ joint venture allegedly engaged in its subterfuge by using Tri
Star to act as an agent in making payments.22 Reports estimate that TSKJ
paid Tri Star $180 million which was remitted to Nigerian public officials
through offshore accounts that allowed TSKJ to obtain contract awards for
building the Bonny Island liquefied natural gas production units.23 Some
evidence has emerged in the French investigation that between 1995 and
17 See Landers & Whittle, supra note 3.
18 Vice President Cheney was the CEO of the company at this time. Mr. Cheney
remained in the position of CEO until 2000 when he became U.S. Vice President. The
acquisition made Halliburton legally responsible for all of M.W. Kellogg's actions while
involved in TSKJ. See Thomas Catan et al., Halliburton Tries to Limit Fall-Out from
Nigeria 'Bribes' Case, FIN. TIMES, June 23, 2004, at 8, available at 2004 WLNR 9775449.
19 See Shaka Momodu, Halliburton Has Nothing To Do with the $180 Million Scam,
THIS DAY (NIG.), Nov. 6, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 16864838. The two units within
Halliburton include KBR Engineering and Construction Group which "designs liquefied
natural gas plants, refining and processing plants and production facilities" along with the
Energy Services Group which "offers products, services, and integrated solutions for oil and
gas exploration, development and production." Halliburton.com, supra note 3.
20 Executives from M. W. Kellogg who were active participants in the alleged bribery
activity were Albert "Jack" Stanley, who was with M .W. Kellogg for years, served as
chairman of KBR and then a consultant, and William Chaudan, former manager of the
London office of M. W. Kellogg who was a consultant on the Nigerian project. See Landers
& Whittle, supra note 3.
21 Tri Star Investments is registered in Gibraltar, a British tax haven. Isikoff &
Hosenball, supra note 7. Jeffrey Tesler was the owner of Tri Star and also the London
lawyer of M.W. Kellogg Company. Tesler was reported to have been a financial advisor to
Nigeria's late military dictator, General Sani Abacha. Id. A French magistrate has officially
placed Jeffrey Tesler under investigation for corruption of a foreign public official. Id.
22 "French investigators have found evidence of four payments totaling $166 million to
Mr. Tesler's Tri-Star Investments from 1995 to 2002 that roughly coincided with contract
awards for the Nigeria LNG project worth $6.7 billion." See Landers & Whittle, supra note
3.
23 Gold, supra note 8.
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2002, dates that "roughly coincided with contract awards for the Nigeria
LNG project worth $6.7 billion," Tri Star paid officials $166 million.2 4
Handwritten notes detailing conversations among representatives of
the consortium between 1993 and 1998, discuss the possibility of bribes to
Nigerian officials to win bids for construction of the $12 billion Nigeria
Liquefied Natural Gas Project, thus offering support for allegations of
bribery. 25 Subsequent to the discovery of the notes, Halliburton disclosed
their contents to the SEC.26
Although some of the alleged misconduct took place from 1995 to
1998, before the M.W. Kellogg parent corporation, Dresser, was acquired
by Halliburton, the merger may have carried with it the liabilities of the
target company. To further attach the possibility of liability to Halliburton,
the suspect payments continued until 2002-after the merger-when a




The bribery issue first came to the attention of the French in 2002
when a Paris prosecutor received information from an official of Technip,
28
a French company that was a partner in TSKJ consortium, about a Nigerian
"slush fund" when the official was being questioned about his role in the
alleged acts of fraud by the French oil company, Elf Aquitane
(subsequently Total).29 In January 2002, roughly at the same time of the
Technip official's testimony, France implemented the OECD Convention
through a Penal Code amendment. 30  The prosecutor then transferred the
case to a French magistrate, Renaud van Ruymbeke of the Tribunal De
Grande Instance De Paris, who began his investigation into the matter in
24 Landers & Whittle, supra note 3.
25 Press Release, Halliburton Co., Halliburton Provides Update on Investigation into
Nigerian Project (Sept. 1, 2004), available at http://www.halliburton.com/news/archives/
2004/corpnws090104.jsp.
26 Id.
27 See Isikoff & Hosenball, supra note 7.
28 Id.
29 There was an "eight-year investigation of the formerly state-owned group [Elf
Aquitiane] and a colorful public trial that exposed tales of bribery, adultery and influence-
peddling that extended from plush government offices in Paris to the capitals of France's
former West African colonies." Nicola Clark, Appeal Hearings Open for 2 Former Elf
Chiefs Court to Review Corruption Convictions, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 7, 2004, at 3.
3 C. P6n. Art. 435, translated at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/htmUcodes-traduits/
code_penaltextan.htm; see also Law No. 2000-595 of June 30, 2000, Journal Officiel de la
R~publique Frangaise, supra note 3, at 9944 (modifying the Penal Code).
B. GEORGE & K LACEY
October 2003-one of the first bribery scandals under the new amendment
of the French Penal Code.3' After the investigation is complete, Mr.
Ruymbeke has the power to recommend either a criminal trial or that the
authorities drop the matter.32
Following the discovery, the French regulators informed their U.S.




In February 2004, as a result of the information obtained from French
regulators, the DOJ opened an inquiry into possible FCPA violations by
Halliburton.34 A report of this inquiry first appeared in Halliburton's 10K
filed with the SEC on March 1, 2004 in which it stated that the U.S.
Department of Justice and SEC have met with Halliburton to discuss the
French magistrate's investigation. 35 It further stated that the agencies had
"asked Halliburton for cooperation and access to information in reviewing
the matter in light of the requirements of the United States Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act.",36 In later SEC filings, there is mention of the company's
understanding that the DOJ had "invoked its authority under a sitting grand




Although the SEC had made informal requests for cooperation earlier
in the year, in June 2004 the SEC opened a formal investigation of
Halliburton to determine if FCPA violations occurred.38 Halliburton issued
a press release regarding the SEC investigation into the "more than $100
million in payments that a joint venture involving its Kellogg Brown &
Root subsidiary in the building of a huge Nigerian natural gas complex.
3 9
31 See Zagaris, supra note 5, at 4; Isikoff& Hosenball, supra note 7.
32 Gold, supra note 8.
33 Goldhaber, supra note 13.
34 Isikoff & Hosenball, supra note 7.
35 Halliburton Co., Annual Report, supra note 3, at 54.
36 id.
37 Id. at 21; Halliburton Co., Quarterly Report (Form l0-Q), at 16 (Oct. 31, 2005),
available at www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/45012/000004501205000346/
edsept2005 1 Oqfinal.htm [hereinafter Halliburton Co., Quarterly Report].
38 Press Release, Halliburton Announces SEC Investigation, supra note 8.
39 See Gold, supra note 8. Although the initial investigation related to "more than $100
million in payments," the amount has been placed at closer to $180 million. Id.
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In SEC filings, Halliburton reports that it has produced documents to the
SEC both voluntarily and pursuant to subpoenas, and that it is making its
employees available to the SEC for testimony.40
E. NIGERIAN INVESTIGATION
The Nigerian House of Representatives Committee on Public Petitions
engaged in an investigation of the alleged bribery activities of
Halliburton/TSKJ and held hearings starting in early 2004 to identify those
who may have benefited from the alleged bribe money and to determine the
extent the Nigerian Government might have suffered losses in the
transactions .4  This was followed by a public inquiry into the same matter
by the National Assembly.4 2
According to the 1OQ filed with the SEC by Halliburton on October
31, 2005, the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission,
"which is organized as part of the executive branch of the government," is
also investigating these matters.43  The 1OQ further reports that "TSKJ
notified the Nigerian Attorney General that TSKJ would not oppose the
Attorney General's efforts to have sums of money held on deposit in banks
in Switzerland transferred to Nigeria and to have the legal ownership of
such sums determined in the Nigerian courts.4
III. RELEVANT FCPA PROVISIONS
When the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was adopted in 1977, it was
the first anti-bribery legislation ever adopted by a nation.45 For the next
twenty years, corporations governed by U.S. securities laws were the sole
companies constrained in competing on an increasingly global level, by the
40 Halliburton Co., Annual Report, supra note 3, at 20; Halliburton Co., Quarterly
Report, supra note 37, at 16.
41 Zagaris, supra note 5, at 4; see Ogbu, supra note 6. As a result of difficulties
encountered in obtaining cooperation from witnesses, the House Committee on Public
Petition sought a Nigerian court order to request that the French judge allow the committee
to inspect the documents in the Halliburton/TSKJ case file. See Mike Oduniyi, TSKJ Probe:
'Court Ruling on French Judge Delivered,' THIS DAY (NIG.), Jan. 24, 2005, available at
2005 WLNR 1079727.
42 Hector Igbikiowubo, N/A Opens Public Hearing into TSKI's $180M Bribery Scandal,
VANGUARD (NIG.), Oct. 19, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 16857621.
43 Halliburton Co., Quarterly Report, supra note 37, at 16.
44 Id. at 17.
45 Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, On the Threshold of
the Adoption of Global Antibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and
International Efforts Toward the Reduction of Business of Corruption, 32 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 6 (1999) [hereinafter George, Lacey & Birmele, On the Threshold of the
Adoption of Global Antibribery Legislation].
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criminal and civil penalties integral to the FCPA. These corporations were
vocal in expressing their concerns that they were placed at a competitive
disadvantage by the restrictions imposed by the statute.46 While the global
marketplace has been altered by the adoption of the OECD, it is important
to consider the FCPA provisions.
The Act is divided into two sections: The first section specifically
prohibits bribery of foreign officials,47 and the second section includes
accounting provisions-both corporate recordkeeping and internal control
requirements-intended to deter and detect such illicit payments.48
To facilitate understanding of the FCPA and its impact on
government's ability to curb business corruption, the substantive content of
the statute and its amendments are reviewed briefly in the following
sections.
A. ANTI-BRIBERY PROVISIONS
The anti-bribery provisions include:
1) a prohibition against the direct and indirect bribery of foreign
officials by issuers and reporting firms under the jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.49
2) a prohibition of direct and indirect bribery of foreign officials by
domestic concerns, including any U.S. citizen, national, or resident, and any
business entity organized under U.S. law.
50
Through the use of the term "domestic concerns"51 both SEC
registrants and non-registrants are covered by the Act.52 These prohibitions
are targeting the corrupt offering, giving, or promising anything of value in
order to influence the decision of an individual in an official capacity in
order "to obtain, retain, or direct business" transactions.53
46 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICEs ACT ON
U.S. BusiNEss: COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 6 (1981) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT] (noting that many corporate officials believe the costs of complying exceed
the benefits, and that complying caused U.S. firms to lose business). See Goldhaber, supra
note 13.
47 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. Law No. 95-213, §§ 103(a)-104(a), 91
Stat. 1494, 1495-98, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (2000 & Supp.
2005)).
48 § 102, 91 Stat. at 1495 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)).
49 § 103a, 91 Stat. at 1495-96 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)).
50 § 104, 91 Stat. at 1496-98 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a), (h)).
"' 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
52 Id.
5' H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 921 (1988) [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT].
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The Act prohibits bribes to "any person, while knowing or having
reason to know that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be
offered, given or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, 5 4
"to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for
foreign political office. ' 55 The "reason to know" standard facilitates the
ability of prosecutors to prove the requisite intent for prohibited acts under
the FCPA.56
B. ACCOUNTING PROVISIONS
The two accounting provisions of the original Act of primary
importance are:
1) Section 13(b)(2)(A) mandates the financial recordkeeping standards
for all corporations, who are required to "make and keep books, records,
and accounts, which in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the
transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer;" 57 and
2) Section 13(b)(2)(B) obligates corporations to "devise and maintain a
system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable
assurances that transactions and assets are properly maintained.
58
Legislative history indicates that an important factor in enacting the
FCPA was a desire to protect the investor, and "to restore the efficacy of the
system of corporate accountability." 59 The significant effect of the passage
of these sections was to give the SEC authority over the entire financial
management and reporting requirements of those corporations subject to the
registration and reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("Exchange Act"). 60 "The accounting provisions were considered by
14 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78 dd-2(d)(2).
" Id. § 78dd-l(a)(3).
56 Id. § 78dd-2(2).
7 Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
58 Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
59 GAO REPORT, supra note 46, at 69 (citing a report to the SEC); see SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
95TH CONG., 1 ST SESS., QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES,
at b (COMM. PRINT 1976) [hereinafter SEC REPORT].
60 Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara Crutchfield George, Expansion of SEC Authority into
Internal Corporate Governance: The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (A Twentieth Anniversary Review), 7:2 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y
119, 153 (1998) [hereinafter Lacey & George, Expansion of SEC Authority into Internal
Corporate Governance]; SEC. v.World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 746 (N.D.
Ga. 1983).
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some to be the broadest application of federal law to corporate management
and accountability since the 1934 Act."
61
The SEC exercised its expanded authority when it promulgated two
rules under the authority of the FCPA. Those rules, Rule 13b2-1 62 and Rule
13b2-2,63  further clarified the recordkeeping and internal control
responsibilities of management under the FCPA. These two Rules indicate
that the SEC's interpretation of the FCPA is that the statute conferred
authority on the SEC to further intervene in corporate internal affairs. A
longtime critic of the SEC's exercise of authority in the area of corporate
internal governance reforms argues that "the SEC achieved its objective" of
obtaining more power to regulate the internal affairs of public companies
"by persuading Congress to enact section 13(b) of the Exchange Act., 64
Until 1977 federal securities law had been founded on the principle
that market efficiency is enhanced by the disclosure to investors of relevant
material financial information. 65  Through the FCPA, Congress
intentionally allows the SEC to go far beyond the disclosure function by
granting it new rulemaking and enforcement authority over the internal
control and recordkeeping mechanisms of its registrants.66
C. ALLOWABLE PAYMENTS AND DEFENSES
1. Facilitating Payments
An exception to the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA applies to
insubstantial payments made merely to facilitate or expedite performance of
"routine governmental action." 67  The "routine governmental action"
contemplates non-discretionary acts of lower level government officials
which are generally limited to ministerial or clerical acts which expedite the
61 Lacey & George, supra note 60, at 153.
62 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1 (2005).
63 Id. § 240.13b2-2.
64 ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 155 (1982); Roberta S. Karmel,
Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas-The Securities and Exchange Commission
Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 88 (2005).
65 Lacey & George, Expansion of SEC Authority into ;nternal Corporate Governance,
supra note 60, at 123.
66 D. Goelzer, The Accounting Provisions of the FCPA-The Federalization of Corporate
Recordkeeping and Internal Control, 5 J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (1979).
67 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (2000 & Supp. 2005). Congress intended this exemption to
cover nominal payments used to expedite a business transaction which were made to persons
whose duties did not include policy-making functions. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note
53, at 921.
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processing of a matter that the official is already obligated to undertake and
complete.
2. Affirmative Defenses
The two FCPA affirmative defenses, which place the burden of proof
on the defendant to show that a payment is lawful, are:
(1) "Payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value" provided
that such offerings are in accordance with the written laws of that country.68
(2) "Payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value" that
constitute a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel or lodging.
It must be related to the promotion of products or services, or "the
execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government."6 9
3. Halliburton's Defensive Arguments
Halliburton denies any wrongdoing and is launching a strong defensive
strategy during the course of the investigations. The attorney for the owner
of Tri Star told the Wall Street Journal that the money TSKJ gave his client
was a fee for services rendered which would bring it within the scope of the
FCPA facilitating payment exception and raise one of the affirmative
defenses. Mr. Remy Caulier, Vice President of Halliburton Energy
Services, defended Halliburton strenuously in an interview reported in a
Nigerian newspaper in the fall of 2004.70 In the interview, Mr. Caulier
repeatedly referred to Halliburton's Code of Business Conduct and to the
company's emphasis on ethics, but he made no reference to the company's
FCPA Compliance Code.7 '
Although it has not been proven that payments were actually made, the
handwritten "notes" from TSKJ meetings referring to a series of possible
"secret" and "open" agency payments undermine the defense that the
payments were legitimate business costs. 72 Halliburton's 1OQ, filed with
68 15 U.S.C. § 78dd.-lc(1).
69 Id. § 78dd.-lc(2).
70 Momodu, supra note 19. Mr. Caulier argued that Halliburton's name had been
unfairly connected with the TSKJ scandal, and implied that perhaps the media was
responsible for exploiting the connection. He tried to substantiate his position with the
tenuous argument that the link between TSKJ and Halliburton only existed through the 25%
interest that its KBR business unit had in the TSKJ joint venture. Id.
71 Id. Although in his interview, Mr. Caulier correctly refused to link Halliburton Energy
Services and TSKJ, he failed to recognize that the structural link between Halliburton Co.
and KBR carried with it the legal significance of a parent corporation's responsibility for the
acts of its subsidiary. See id.
72 Thomas Catan & Michael Peel, SEC Widens Nigeria Bribe Probe with Shell
Subpoena, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005, at 15.
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the SEC on October 31, 2005, states that the matter is under investigation
and "cover[s] an extended period of time in some cases significantly before
[its] 1998 acquisition of Dresser Industries. 73 This highlights the problem
of an acquiring company failing to diligently assess potential liabilities in
the discovery of FCPA violations prior to acquisition.74 The company
reports in its 1OQ that there is a general disengagement from former
employees of M.W. Kellogg, who allegedly participated in the acts of
bribery.
75
D. 1988 AND 1998 AMENDMENTS TO THE FCPA
In 1988 Congress amended the FCPA in the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act ("Trade Act").76  Various provisions included
clarification of facilitating payments (related to the anti-bribery section of
the statute),77 and clarification of the potential liability of a parent company
for the conduct of its subsidiaries (related to the recordkeeping and internal
control parts of the statute).78 Importantly, the 1988 Trade Act included a
provision that encouraged the U.S. President to promote an international
agreement through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development to prohibit the payment of bribes by corporations in the
industrialized nations.79
The timing of this mandate was fortuitous due to changing dynamics in
the international community. Twenty years after the adoption of the FCPA,
various developments in the global economy, including factors such as the
transition of many former socialist countries to market economies at the end
of the Cold War; the increased integration of Europe, the proliferation of
international mergers, the advent of a borderless global market enhanced by
technological advances; and a developing worldwide awareness of the
73 Halliburton Co., Quarterly Report, supra note 37, at 17.
74 Lockheed Martin Corp. did not complete its plans to buy Titan Corp. after a potential
FCPA compliance problem emerged during the due diligence examination and Titan failed
to resolve its FCPA problems with Federal agencies. "Lockheed, eager not to inherit any
liability Titan might face from the probe," ended its efforts towards a merger. See Stephen
Manning, Lockheed Ends $1.66 Billion Titan Deal After Deadline Passes, ASSOCIATED
PRESS WORLDSTREAM, June 26, 2004, available at http://www.cantonrep.com/
index.php?Category=5&ID = 169234&r-5.
75 Halliburton Co., Quarterly Report, supra note 37, at 17.
76 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 [hereinafter Trade Act].
77 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
71 Id. § 78m(b)(6).
79 Id. § 78dd-1.
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economic costs of corruption 80 led to the adoption, in 1997, of the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions.8' The U.S., as a signatory to the
OECD Convention, then needed to modify its statutes to be in compliance
with the OECD Convention, resulting in the amendments incorporated in
the 1998 International Anti-bribery and Fair Competition Act. One
noteworthy change under the modified statute is that "Americans and
American companies are liable for bribery even if their conduct occurs
completely outside U.S. terrain and they have not used the U.S. mails or
otherwise engaged in interstate commerce. ' 83 Additionally, it is clear that
the FCPA applies to the actions of foreign companies that trade on the U.S.
securities markets.8
The FCPA, as amended in 198885 and 199886 carries potentially serious
criminal and civil penalties for violations of its provisions. Congress
drastically increased the penalties for violations of the bribery section of the
amended Act.87 The civil liability of domestic concerns and issuers was
increased to $2 million. 88  "Natural persons that are officers, directors,
employees or agents of such domestic concerns who willfully violate the
anti-bribery sections" can be fined up to $100,000 and imprisoned up to 5
years. 89 As provided in the original Act, corporations are precluded from
indemnifying their employees against liability. 90 Penalties related to the
conviction of a person for recordkeeping violations, such as the willful use
of false and misleading statements in the financial records, include fines up
to $5 million and imprisonment of up to twenty years.9 1
80 George, Lacey & Birmele, On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global Antibribery
Legislation, supra note 45, at 4.
81 OECD Convention, supra note 2.
82 International Anti-bribery and Fair Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(2)(iii),
78dd-1 (a)(3)(iii).
83 Goldhaber, supra note 13.
84 Id.
85 See Trade Act, supra note 76.
86 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
87 Id. §§ 78ff(c)(1)(A), 78dd-2(g)(1)(A).
88 Id.
89 Id. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A).
90 Id. §§ 78ff(c)(3), 78dd-2(g)1(3).
9' See id. § 78ff(a).
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E. RECENTLY INCREASED ENFORCEMENT OF FCPA VIOLATIONS
In the last five years, there has been an increased aggressiveness by the
SEC and DOJ in enforcement of FCPA civil and criminal violations.92 In
2005 alone there was a significant increase in prosecution of FCPA
violations by both the SEC and DOJ. "In 2005 the average number of
prosecutions by the DOJ has been four times the average of the preceding
five years. 93  A number of pertinent issues, as discussed below, are
highlighted by the increased enforcement, including the impact on
corporations of voluntary disclosure of discovered FCPA violations, the
imposition of liability on parent companies for the violations of their
foreign subsidiaries, and potential liability of a merging corporation for past
FCPA violations of its target corporation.
94
IV. CURRENT FCPA CASES AND POLICY
A. POSSIBLE PARENT COMPANY LIABILITY FOR THE BRIBERY OF A
FOREIGN OFFICIAL BY A SUBSIDIARY
1. FCPA Subsidiary Provision
Because of the parent-subsidiary relationship between Halliburton and
M.W. Kellogg (that later joined with Brown and Root to become KBR, the
lead partner in the TSKJ joint venture), the FCPA section clarifying a
corporation's responsibility for the financial record-keeping and internal
accounting controls of its subsidiaries will be relevant for Halliburton in the
pending investigations. 95 The amendment applies to all issuers of SEC
registered securities with respect to the accounting practices of either a
foreign or domestic subsidiary.96  This particular provision clarifies
corporate responsibility of a parent company for its subsidiaries in regard to
potential liability for the subsidiaries' FCPA violations based on the
percentage of ownership in the subsidiary.97
If a corporation holds 50 percent or less of the voting power in a
foreign or domestic firm, the corporation is only required to "proceed in
92 See id. §§ 78ff(c)(3), 78dd-2(g)l(3), 78ff(a).
93 DANFORTH NEWCOMB ET AL., SHEARMAN & STERLING, RECENT TRENDS AND PATTERNS
IN FCPA ENFORCEMENT (2005), available at http:i/www.shearman.com/lit_1005/ (follow
"Download PDF" hyperlink).
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good faith to use its influence, to the extent reasonable under the issuer's
circumstances," to cause the subsidiary to comply with the recordkeeping
and internal control requirements of the FPCA.98 A corporation covered by
the statute that owns more than 50 percent of the subsidiary would have to
require that subsidiary to comply fully with the financial reporting and
internal control provisions of the statute.
99
The legislative history of the amendment reflects the concerns of
business that it is often not feasible for a minority owner to exert enough
influence over a subsidiary to force compliance with the FCPA accounting
provisions.' ° °  The amendment, therefore, proceeds to clarify further
circumstances which would be relevant in determining whether or not
"good faith" efforts were reasonable.' 0 ' The laws and customs governing
the business operations of the country in which the subsidiary is located and
the relative percentage of ownership are specifically mentioned. 1
02
Relevant, objective documentation of attempts made to address FCPA
compliance is a corporation's best opportunity to prove good faith efforts.
This good faith showing legally results in a conclusive presumption of
FCPA compliance for the United States parent corporation. 10 3 Therefore, it
can be a vital defense to a company charged with possible violation. A U.S.
company with a minority share holding in a foreign or domestic subsidiary,
such as Halliburton, should develop a specific plan to address this good
faith effort.
Discussed below is a recent case, demonstrating the U.S. government's
perspective on enforcement of parent-subsidiary liability and its potential
impact on the Halliburton investigation.
2. SEC vs. Schering-Plough'04
Although the possibility of Halliburton's liability for misconduct rests
with the 25% interest that its subsidiary, KBR, had in the TSKJ joint
venture, the parent company bears the risk when it fails to ensure FCPA
98 Id.
99 Id. § 78m(b)(2).
100 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 53, at 917.
101 Id.
102 id.
103 John E. Impert, A Program for Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and Foreign Law Restrictions on the Use of Sales Agents, 24 INT'L LAW. 1009, 1016 (1990).
104 SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 1:04CV00945, 2004 WL 2057340 (D.D.C. June
9, 2004) (trial pleading).
B. GEORGE & K. LACEY
compliance by subsidiaries. 0 5 This responsibility of the parent corporation
is reflected in the SEC and Schering-Plough negotiated settlement of
penalties related to the asserted bribery and recordkeeping/internal control
violations of one of its Polish subsidiaries.'0 6  The alleged bribery (of
approximately $76,000) related to donations made by a Polish subsidiary to
a "charitable foundation to induce the foundation's president, who was also
a Polish government official, to influence the purchase of Schering-
Plough's pharmaceutical products."' 0 7 The parent company did not have
any knowledge of the subsidiary's illicit payments, yet the SEC charged
that the parent company's (Schering-Plough) internal accounting controls
were inadequate to prevent or detect the payments. 0 8 The settlement
between the SEC and Schering-Plough included a civil fine of $500,000
and a commitment by Schering-Plough to retain an independent consultant
to monitor their internal controls, recordkeeping and financial reporting.' 
09
This case illustrates a number of current and major concerns identified
by the SEC in FCPA enforcement. First, it evidences the assertive
enforcement of the SEC in investigating and prosecuting parent companies
for the alleged bribery of foreign officials by their subsidiaries. Second, it
clarifies the expectations of the SEC as to the nature and extent of an
issuer's internal, controls to identify and halt FCPA violations by a
subsidiary. Thus, it may be inferred from Schering-Plough that when a
questionable payment involving a subsidiary arises, the SEC's position is
that the parent company is likely liable because its internal controls failed to
deter and/or detect the illegal payment. Third, this case represents a number
of recent enforcement actions where the government is utilizing an
independent compliance reviewer to evaluate and ensure that the firm is
implementing the appropriate FCPA mandated systems.
105 Id The SEC expects an issuer's internal controls to prevent and detect FCPA
violations in the issuer's foreign subsidiaries, as illustrated in SEC v. Schering-Plough trial
pleading. Complaint at 11, Schering-Plough, No. 1:04CV00945, 2004 WL 2057340,
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18740.pdf.
'06 Schering-Plough, 2004 WL 2057340; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
SEC Files Settled Enforcement Action Against Schering-Plough Corporation for Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Violations (June 9, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/lr18740.htm [hereinafter Press Release, SEC, SEC Files Enforcement
Action].
107 Complaint, supra note 105, at 1.
log Id.
109 Press Release, SEC, SEC Files Enforcement Action, supra note 106.
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B. EFFECT OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES ON SUBSEQUENT FCPA
INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS
The SEC has encouraged voluntary disclosure of information since the
passage of the first FCPA in 1977,10 and the SEC has further encouraged
disclosure by companies in the so-called Thompson memorandum of
2003.111 This is reflected in Halliburton's 10-K filed with the SEC on
March 1, 2005 when it revealed that
[a]s a result of our continuing investigation into these matters, information has been
uncovered suggesting that, commencing at least 10 years ago, the members of TSKJ
considered payments to Nigerian officials. We provided this information to the
United States Department of Justice, the SEC, the French magistrate and the Nigerian
Economics and Financial Crimes Commission. We also notified the other owners of
TSKJ of the recently uncovered information and asked each of them to conduct their
own investigation.
The "recently uncovered information" to which Halliburton referred
was handwritten notes taken at meetings of TSKJ executives as far back as
1993.113 The contents of the documents were reported to "have been seen"
by Financial Times (London), 14 and the TSKJ partners "discuss a series of
possible 'secret' and 'open' agency payments" with one proposal rejected
because it might invite blackmail and another rejected because it sets up the
'wrong' paper trail."1 15 There were references to "cultural" agreements and
some names were mentioned next to notations of "covered directly" and
"already covered." The notes do not say whether the proposals were agreed
to or implemented, but certainly inferences can and have been made by the
investigating agencies. These notes have become a serious part of the
evidence being investigated.
1. Pre-emptive Disclosure
A question arises as to whether Halliburton, in doing its due diligence
investigation preceding its proposed merger with Dresser Industries in
1998, should have discovered and disclosed to the SEC that there had been
110 FCPA, supra note 1.
" Memorandum, Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/
corporate guidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum].
112 Halliburton Co., Annual Report supra note 3, at 21.
113 Id.
114 Catan & Peel, supra note 72.
115 Id.
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payments to foreign officials by TSKJ based solely on its knowledge of
Nigeria's reputation for high levels of corruption.'
16
Although the "notes" were written about meetings held by TSKJ
executives some years before Halliburton acquired Dresser Industries and
its subsidiary M.W. Kellogg, this situation mirrors the deal-breaker in the
2004 Lockheed Martin-Titan proposed merger in which payments made by
Titan to foreign consultants were discovered and disclosed to the SEC.
1 17
The only difference is that Dresser Industries did not reveal to Halliburton
any information regarding the purported bribes of Nigerian officials before
the merger. However, like Lockheed, Halliburton was aware that there are
some general corruption problems in the country in which the merging
corporation was doing business, but did not probe further. Implicit in the
cases in which companies have gone voluntarily to the SEC and DOJ while
a merger was pending, but before closing, is their concern that the acquiring
company risks successor liability for prior violations of the target company
unless the issues were resolved prior to closing.' 18
2. Rules of Voluntary Disclosure
The primary concern that companies have with potentially
incriminating information like the TSKJ "notes" described above is that the
government agencies will use it as the basis for opening or furthering an
investigation in which the ultimate result could be indictments for criminal
misconduct or civil enforcement charges. In an attempt to mitigate the civil
and criminal penalties and avoid or defer prosecution, companies can
consider the option of voluntarily disclosing to the SEC or DOJ any
potentially damaging information that has been discovered.
a. The DOJ "Thompson Memorandum" and SEC "Seaboard Report"
The FCPA does not mandate disclosure of possible FCPA violations,
but DOJ issued the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations, often referred to as the "Thompson Memorandum"1 1 9 on
January 20, 2003, which focuses "increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the
116 Nigeria ranked eighty-one out of eighty-five with a score of 1.9 with the highest score
being 10 in the 1998 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. Transparency
International, The Corruption Perceptions Index (1998), http://www.transparency.org/
policyand research/surveysindices/cpi/previouscpi 1/1998 (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
117 See Manning, supra note 74.
118 Homer E. Moyer, Jr., The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-Its Many Lives,
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL, July, 2005, at 51.
119 Thompson Memorandum, supra note I11.
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authenticity of a corporation's cooperation."120  The memo established a
middle ground that gives corporations an opportunity to cooperate and
avoid or defer prosecution.1 21  It sets forth the factors that the DOJ
considers when determining whether to prosecute a company, which
includes "the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing
and its willingness to cooperate in the [government's] investigation.,
122
Under the terms of the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations, the DOJ has a strong inducement to forego or defer
prosecution of FCPA violations (i.e., enter into a non-prosecution or
deferred prosecution agreement) when the errant corporation: 1) voluntarily
discloses illegal payments; 2) initiates appropriate disciplinary action
against the perpetrators; 3) completely discloses the results of the
corporation's internal investigation; and 4) agrees to continue to cooperate
with the government and to prove continuing compliance. 23  The
Thompson Memorandum indicates that a waiver of attorney-client
privilege and work-product privilege can also be counted as a bona fide
indication of a corporation's willingness to work cooperatively.
124
However, it does not provide a guarantee against prosecution.
125
The SEC, in its Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1034 and Commission Statement on the
Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, also
announced an "avoid or defer" program similar to the one enunciated by the
DOJ in 2001.126 This SEC Report is referred to as the "Seaboard Report"
because it was issued for the purpose of explaining why it declined to file




121 Leonard Post, Deferrals on Rise in Foreign Bribery, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 15, 2005, at 1,
18.
122 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 111.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 This observation was part of comments attributed to Nicole Healy, a former Justice
department FCPA specialist who is currently at a law firm in California. Post, supra note
121, at 18.
126 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44969, Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Release No. 1470 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at www.sec.gov/litigation/
investreport/34-44969.htm [hereinafter Seaboard Report].
127 Russell G. Ryan, Cooperation in SEC Enforcement: The Carrot Becomes the Stick,
19:33 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, WASH. LEGAL FouND. 1, 2 (2004).
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As one author described the SEC action, the Seaboard Report is
considered a critical SEC pronouncement because it 1) "represented the
Commission's first detailed, written guidance for investigated companies
and their counsel concerning the benefits of cooperation," and 2) it
"demonstrated in a concrete way that a fuilly cooperative company could,
under appropriate circumstances, spare itself from any enforcement
charges."
128
b. Significance of SEC v. In Vision Technologies, Inc.
Halliburton/TSKJ should consider the InVision Technologies case as
an illuminating example of the way in which the DOJ makes a decision to
enter into a non-prosecution agreement. 129 InVision was the first case in
which the non-prosecution agreement was used in an FCPA context. Just as
the TSKJ "notes" were discovered and disclosed, there was a disclosure by
InVision of "facts obtained in their internal investigation into the potential
FCPA violations. 13 ° It is a strong indication that the government is willing
to forego prosecution of FCPA violations where there is voluntary
disclosure of the illegal payments, where appropriate disciplinary action is
initiated against the perpetrators, and where the company agrees to continue
to cooperate with the government and prove continuing compliance.
1 31
In 2004, the DOJ and InVision signed a non-prosecution agreement
(the first FCPA non-prosecution agreement in an FCPA case) related to an
investigation of allegedly illegal payments made by InVision's foreign
agents in Thailand, China, and the Philippines in order to secure the sale of
its airport security screening machines, 132 and in regard to an insufficient
internal control system of the parent company which failed to detect the
questionable payments.' 33  InVision, whose suspect payments were
uncovered during a due diligence investigation conducted by GE and
InVision as part of a merger arrangement,1 34 and which were voluntarily
disclosed to the DOJ and SEC, agreed to the following terms:
" To accept responsibility for its misconduct;
" To pay a penalty of $800,000; and
128 ld. at 1.
129 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, InVision Technologies, Inc. Enters Into Agreement
with the United States (Dec. 6, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/
December/04crm780.htm [hereinafter Press Release, DOJ, InVision Technologies].
130 
.
131 Id.; NEWCOMBE ET AL., supra note 93.
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To "[f]ully and affirmatively disclose to the Department and
the SEC activities that InVision believes may violate the
FCPA" and to continue to cooperate with the government.
1 35
In a separate agreement, GE, in exchange for a non-prosecution
commitment from the DOJ, acquiesced to "[i]ntegrate the InVision business
into GE's FCPA compliance program and retain an independent consultant
to evaluate the efficacy of GE's effort in that regard" and to continue to
cooperate with DOJ and SEC in any material investigations.
136
3. The Sentencing Guidelines as a Voluntary Disclosure Incentive
The Sentencing Guidelines play an important role in encouraging
voluntary disclosures of actual or suspected violations of the FCPA. The
only way for a defendant to try to escape the consequences of a guideline
sentence is to cooperate. Under section 5KI.1 of the Sentencing
Guidelines, the government is permitted to reward a cooperating
corporation by departing from the Guidelines and going down to whatever
level it thinks appropriate in return for "substantial assistance," which
includes true, complete and reliable disclosures in pursuing an
investigation. 137 "Pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, in order to
qualify for mitigation of criminal penalties, the [U.S.] company's voluntary
disclosure and cooperation must be both timely and thorough and may
require a waiver of the attorney-client and work product privileges."' 13' The
Guidelines allow companies to reduce their culpability score 139 if prior to
the "imminent threat of disclosure of the government investigation," and
"within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the offense, it
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES
MANUAL (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2004guid/gl2004.pdf, see also Matthew
J. Jacobs, 'Booker' May Result in Less Defendant Cooperation, NAT. L.J., Mar. 21, 2005, at
S9. The 2005 Booker decision has given new authority to judges, "many of whom have
chafed under the constraints on their authority and who believe that their wisdom and
judgment should come into play in sentencing decisions." Id. The decision requires judges
to "consider" the guidelines, but otherwise renders the guidelines advisory. Id. However,
courts have been encouraged by the DOJ to rely on the guidelines just as before. United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005).
138 F. Joseph Warin & Jason A. Monahan, Recent Developments Under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: Lessons for Compliance and Disclosure, 19:6 INSIGHTS 9, 14 (2005),
available at http://drm.fostereprints.com/eprints/oss/aspen/227116/227116.pdf.
139 The sentencing judge applies the Sentencing Guidelines to determine whether an
organization's culpability score is between good (zero) and bad (10 or more). See David
Meister & Albert Berry l1t, Revised Guidelines Stress Self-Audits, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 21, 2005,
at S1.
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reports the offense, fully cooperates, and clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility." Thus, voluntary disclosure by a corporation such as
Halliburton of potentially incriminating evidence to the DOJ and SEC "may
enable the company to either avoid prosecution or result in partial
mitigation of civil and criminal penalties."'4 °
V. CONCLUSION
The increase in FCPA enforcement activities in the U.S. has been
enhanced by a number of factors, including the OECD Convention which
grew partly out of the mandate in the 1988 FCPA amendments that the U.S.
President develop an anti-bribery agreement with member countries of the
OECD. 41  The purpose was to level the playing field for all industrialized
nations belonging to the OECD by making them abide by the same
stringent anti-bribery rules. 142  Increasing globalization has required the
development of a far different and far broader set of rules of business
conduct. Under the emerging world order in the 1990s, bribes could no
longer be considered a normal way of doing business in the countries in
which bribery had been culturally accepted.
It was during the development of this new social and legal order that
Halliburton/TSKJ became ensnared in a multi-jurisdictional investigation of
its alleged bribery and recordkeeping violations. Conduct that was
acceptable or ignored in 1994 when "notes" taken at meetings of TSKJ
executives included references to "cultural agreements" collided with the
new international legal concepts that disavow business corruption and
bribery. In the ten-year period between the formation of the TSKJ joint
venture and the opening of the bribery investigation by the French
magistrate, the world began to shun bribery of government officials for the
purpose of obtaining contracts. 143  The Halliburton investigation and
allegations of illicit conduct in relation to both bribery of a foreign official
and improper financial recordkeeping and internal control violations under
the FCPA, illustrate a number of legal and jurisdictional issues that are
140 Warin & Monahan, supra note 138, at 14.
141 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
142 Most of the corporations engaging in bribery of public officials come from the OECD
member countries. An anti-bribery agreement signed by these countries was viewed as a
very effective way to reduce this corrupt practice.
143 A 2005 Transparency International poll reveals that at this time there is widespread
concern about corruption around the globe. See Press Release, Transparency Int'l, Global
Corruption Barometer 2005 (Dec. 9, 2005), available at http://www.transparency.org/
news-room/in-focus/2005/anti corruption-day/press-releases/barometer2OO5-press-release
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pertinent in the current international and domestic anti-corruption
environment.
One salient factor is the potentially multi-jurisdictional aspect of
suspected violations of anti-corruption measures. As previously noted, in
Halliburton, the U.S. government was notified by French anti-corruption
officials who were investigating the company for potential violation of the
French Penal Code implementing the OECD Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
Additionally, Nigeria is investigating Halliburton's actions; thus there are
three separate jurisdictions that can cooperate and share information in this
investigation.
Another existing characteristic of FCPA enforcement by the SEC and
DOJ is the assertive position that those agencies are taking in regard to the
liability of a parent corporation for the actions of its subsidiaries. These
characteristics are further influenced by the present enforcement policy.
Other relevant factors to an assessment of recent FCPA enforcement
policy include the mitigation, in regard to negotiating a potential non-
prosecution agreement with the government agencies, that can emanate
from voluntary disclosure and cooperation with the government and "the
government's insistence on the waiver of attorney-client privilege and
work-product privilege as a bona fide indication of willingness to work
cooperatively with the government."
144
The legal evolution of global anti-corruption initiatives and policy
from the initial unilateral anti-bribery position adopted by the U.S. in the
1977 FCPA, through the adoption of the OECD Convention in 1999, and
the implementing legislation of its signatory nations has made a remarkable
transformation in the current international business environment.
Multinational corporations, such as Halliburton, which is currently under
investigation, need to be cognizant of the keen scrutiny of the various
national regulators and the potentially grave consequences for FCPA
violators. Multinational firms should consider two critically important
principles. First, a well-informed and thorough FCPA compliance program,
supported by top management and reinforced at every corporate level, is the
best guarantee for avoiding criminal or civil bribery and recordkeeping
charges. Second, when a company discovers probable violations, through a
due diligence investigation linked to a possible merger or an internal control
review, it benefits a U.S. finn to voluntarily disclose their findings to
government, cooperate in the investigation and negotiate a favorable
settlement based on their cooperation.
144 NEWCOMBE ET AL., supra note 93.
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